In this paper, we study the uncoordinated spectrum access problem using the multi-player multi-armed bandits framework. We consider a model where there is no central control and the users cannot communicate with each other. The environment may appear differently to different users, i.e., the mean rewards as seen by different users for a particular channel may be different. Additionally, in case of a collision, we allow for the colliding users to receive non-zero rewards. With this setup, we present a policy that achieves expected regret of order O(log 2+δ T ) for some δ > 0.
INTRODUCTION
Multi-player multi-armed bandit models have been widely used to study the spectrum access problem [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , where there are multiple users vying for a set of channels. The users follow a common protocol that is designed to maximise the system performance. While [6, 8, 9] focus on the primary/secondary user paradigm for spectrum sharing, we consider a different system model where there is no such distinction between the users.
In most of the previous work in this area [1, 4, 6] , it is assumed that the reward distribution for each channel is the same across all users. Given that in a practical scenario, users are not colocated in a wireless network, assuming that users have different reward distributions for the channels results in a more realistic model. There has been some prior work covering varying reward distributions across users [2, 3, 5] . The algorithm presented in [5] considers such a case with an assumption that each player can observe what happens on a channel, i.e., if the channel is free or if there is a collision on it. However such an assumption is unrealistic for the uncoordinated spectrum access problem. In our work, we consider a fully distributed scenario where players have access only to their previous actions and rewards. The work in [3] considers such a setup and uses the method of forced collisions as a way to communicate the estimated mean rewards between users in order for them to compute the optimal matching. The work in [2] also considers such a distributed setting where they use a game-theoretic approach to solve this problem.
Another assumption prevalent in most previous works is that in the case of a collision, all the colliding users get zero reward. However, in the case of a collision in a practical scenario, the colliding users would get a reduced reward. For instance, if the rate of the channel is the quantity represented by the rewards, when two users use the same channel they would get reduced, but not necessarily zero rewards. In [1] , a model is studied which allows for more than one user to access a channel simultaneously and receive non-zero rewards. However, [1] assumes that the reward distributions for each channel is the same across all users. In this paper, we consider the case where the channels may appear differently to the users and the colliding users can receive non-zero rewards. We present an algorithm that achieves expected regret of order O(log 2 T ). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that has considered the case of non-zero rewards on collisions when the users can see the channels differently. Our work is closest to [2] where they use a game theoretic approach to maximise the sum of expected rewards of the users.
SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the set of users [K] to be players in a stochastic game. The action space of each player j is the set of M channels or arms A j = [M ]. Let the time horizon be denoted by T , and the action taken by player j at time t ≤ T be a t,j . The strategy a t is defined as the vector of the actions taken by the players, i.e., a t = [a t,1 , ..., a t,K ]. At any given time, players can observe only their own rewards and cannot observe the actions taken by other players.
In this model, we allow the number of players to be more than the number of channels and the reward for each arm is bounded in [0, 1]. Thus, in the event that more than one user access the same arm m, they would get non-zero rewards. Let the reward obtained by player j at time t where the strategy is a t be denoted by r j (a t,j , k t (a t,j )), where k t (a t,j ) denotes the number of users on the arm a t,j . The mean reward for player j for arm m with k(m) players on the arm is denoted by µ j (m, k(m)). The mean rewards are inversely proportional to the number of users on that arm. We assume that µ j (m, k(m)) becomes negligible for some k(m) ≥ N + 1 where N depends on the system, i.e., µ j (m, k(m)) = 0 for k(m) ≥ N + 1. Thus the maximum number of players allowed is M N The action space for the players A is simply the product space of the individual action spaces, i.e., A = Π K j=1 A j . Let a * ∈ A be such that
In this work, we consider the case where there is a unique optimal matching. Let J 1 = K j=1 µ j (a * j , k(a * j )) be the system reward for the optimal matching and J 2 the system reward for the second optimal matching. In our algorithm we assume that we have access to a lower bound on the value
The expected regret during a time horizon T is defined as:
where the expectation is over the action profiles of the players. We assume we have a lower bound on the parameter
where n 1 , n 2 ∈ [N ], µ j (m, n 1 ), µ j (m, n 2 ) = 0, j ∈ [K] and m ∈ [M ]. Since in our model we allow for more than one user to occupy a channel with non-zero rewards, such a parameter is needed for a user to learn with high probability the number of users occupying the channel along with him based on the reward he gets.
In addition, to estimate the means on each channel as a function of the number of users, we need to impose some separability condition. We use the following separability condition considered in [1] :
, ǫ 2 ∈ (0, 1), σ 2 is the maximum variance of the reward distributions and c is a constant.
ALGORITHM
In most models for uncoordinated spectrum access, one of the main assumptions is that on collision, i.e., more than one user accessing the same channel, the reward received by all the users is zero. However this assumption is not a very realistic assumption since in such a situation, the colliding users would get a reduced reward. Since there is no communication possible between players, on receiving a lower reward than expected, it is necessary to distinguish whether it is because of other users accessing the same channel or because of the stochastic nature of the rewards. Previous works such as [3] and [10] , use the method of forced collisions as a way for the users to communicate their mean rewards to other players. However, the method of forced collisions is not applicable in this scenario due to the above mentioned reason. This work is closest to [2] where they use a game-theoretic approach for the users to take actions (choose arms) to maximise the sum of utilities (mean rewards) of the players.
Our algorithm, summarized in Algorithm 1, proceeds in epochs with each epoch having three phases. The first is the exploration phase in which the players access the channels uniformly in order to estimate the mean rewards of each channel as a function of the number of users occupying that channel via a clustering algorithm. In each epoch ℓ, the exploration phase proceeds for T 0 time units.
The second phase of the algorithm, summarized in Algorithm 1, is a strategic form game where the goal is to maximize the utilities of the players. The dynamics in this phase are adapted from [11] , where they guarantee that the action profile maximising the sum of utilities is played for a majority of the time. Each player j is associated with a state [ā j ,ū j , S j ] whereā j ∈ [M ] is the baseline action of the player,ū j ∈ [0, 1] is the baseline utility of the player and S j ∈ {C, D} is the mood of the player (C denotes content and D denotes discontent). The utility of the player denotes the mean reward of the user for the arm chosen as a function of the number of users on the channel. This phase proceeds in 'plays', where each play lasts c ǫ time units. In each play, every player chooses an action depending on the mood and baseline action and the arm chosen is played for c ǫ time units. The utility of the player for this play is determined according to the mean of the rewards received in the play. The state of the player is updated according to the action and utility in the current play. In epoch ℓ, this phase proceeds for c 2 ℓ 1+δ plays (c 2 c ǫ ℓ 1+δ time units). Starting from d = ⌈ρc 2 ℓ 1+δ ⌉-th play of Algorithm 1, the number of times each action was played that resulted in being content is counted by each user as Proof. Let L T be the last epoch with time horizon T . The regret incurred during the L T epochs can be analysed as the sum of the regret incurred in the three stages of the algorithm. From the structure of the algorithm, we have that L T < log T . Let R 1 , R 2 and R 3 denote the regret incurred during the exploration phase, matching phase and exploitation phase during L T epochs respectively.
1. Exploration phase: Since the exploration phase in each epoch ℓ proceeds for T 0 units
2. Matching phase: In epoch ℓ, the matching phase runs for c 2 c ǫ ℓ 1+δ time units. Thus
3. Exploitation phase: In the exploitation phase, regret is incurred in the following two events:
(a) Let E 1 denote the event that for some user j and channel m and some k(m) ∈ [N ], we have that |µ j (m, k(m)) −μ j (m, k(m))| ≥ ∆. Let probability of this event be P (E 1 ) (b) Let E 2 denote the event that given that all users have |µ j (m, k(m)) −μ j (m, k(m))| ≤ ∆, the action profile chosen in the matching phase of epoch ℓ is not optimal. Let probability of this event for some epoch ℓ be P ℓ (E 2 )
We have from Theorem 2 of [1] that by choosing an appropriate T 0 , we have that P (E 1 ) ≤ e −ℓ and from Lemma 3 that P ℓ (E 2 ) ≤ C ρ exp (−ℓ 1+δ ).
Therefore
Thus 
ESTIMATION PHASE
The exploration phase is required for each player to get estimates of the mean rewards of each channel as a function of number of users on the channel. This phase is derived from the estimation phase of [1] . While in [1] , the clustering algorithm is done to estimate the means of each channel when there is more than one user on the channel, Theorem 2 from [1] holds even if the clustering algorithm is carried out to estimate the means from µ j (m, 1) to µ j (m, N ). Thus by selecting an appropriate T 0 , we have from Theorem 2 of [1] that with probability 1 − e −ℓ , we have |μ j (m, k(m)) − µ j (m, k(m))| ≤ ∆ for epoch ℓ. This allows us to find the optimal action profile for the users using the estimates of the mean rewards, as we have from Lemma 1 of [2] that if the above condition holds, then the optimal action profile chosen according to the estimates is the same as the optimal action profile chosen according to the actual mean rewards. While Lemma 1 of [2] represents J 2 in terms of the mean rewards and collision indicators, it can be seen that the proof holds even when there aren't collision indicators present.
MATCHING PHASE
The aim of Algorithm 2 is for the players to settle on an action profile that maximises the system reward. The utility of a player j occupying channel a j with k(a j ) players on it during Algorithm 2: Initialization: Let c > M N . for t 1 = 1, ..., c 2 ℓ 1+δ do If S j = C, action is chosen according to:
If S j = D, action is chosen according to:
Upon choosing an action a j , this arm is sampled for c ǫ time units and the average reward received isr j . Let
The utility of the user is calculated as:
The state of the user is updated as follows: If S j = C and [a j , u j ] = [ā j ,ū j ], the new state is the same as the previous If S j = C and [a j , u j ] = [ā j ,ū j ] or S j = D,
Algorithm 3: Cluster Run an α-approximation for the k-means problem on input X, obtain β means ν 1 , ..., ν β S r ← {i : |x i − ν r | ≤ |x i − ν s |for everys} Return g(S r ) = 1
|Sr| i∈Sr x i some play is defined as
However, the player receives only the instantaneous reward and do not know k t (a t,j ) in order to determine the utility. Thus, in the matching phase algorithm, once the users have chosen an action profile, they sample their chosen arms for c ǫ time units and the utility is calculated as the nearest µ j (m, n), n ∈ [β] to the sample mean.
The proof follows directly from Hoeffding's inequality. The dynamics in the Matching Phase are adapted from [11] . The dynamics induce a Markov chain over the state
[11] guarantees that during the matching phase, the action profile achieving the optimal sum of utilities is played for a majority of the time. The analysis of [11] relies on the theory of resistance trees for regular perturbed Markov decision processes [12] . The matching phase of our algorithm differs in two aspects from [11] . The first is that our strategic form game is not interdependent. This property is used in [11] only to characterize the recurrence classes of the unperturbed process (ǫ = 0). However, using the structure of our utilities, we have the following lemma giving the same recurrence classes as in [11] . Lemma 2. Let D 0 represent the set of states in which everyone is discontent. Let C 0 represent the set of states in which each agent is content and the benchmark action and utility are aligned. Then the recurrence classes of the unperturbed process are D 0 and all singletons z ∈ C 0 .
Proof. In the unperturbed process, if all the users are discontent, they remain discontent with probability 1. Thus we have that D 0 represents a single recurrence class. In each state z ∈ C 0 , each player chooses the same action and since the baseline utility and utility are aligned, each user stays content with probability 1. Thus we have that D 0 and singletons z ∈ C 0 are recurrence classes.
To see that the above are the only recurrence classes, look at any state that has atleast one discontent user and atleast one content user. We have that the baseline actions and utilities of the content users are aligned (since this is the unperturbed process). Consider one of the discontent users. This user chooses an action at random and there is a positive probability (bounded away from 0) of choosing the action of a content user. This would cause the utility of the content user to become misaligned thus leading to that player becoming discontent. This continues until all players become discontent. Thus any such state cannot be a recurrent state. Now consider a state where all agents are content, but there is atleast one user i whose benchmark action and utility are not aligned. for the unperturbed process, in the following step, the same action profile would be played but this would cause user i to become discontent and it follows from the previous argument that this leads to all players becoming discontent.
Thus we have that D 0 and all singletons in C 0 are the only recurrent states of the unperturbed process.
The second way in which our algorithm differs from [11] is that there is a probability of error p ǫ in calculating a user's utility. However, this can be represented as an ǫ perturbation by rewriting the state update step as follows:
If the player is content:
If
where we have from Lemma 1 that p ǫ ≤ ǫ c . The second and third transitions when a player is content and [a j , u ′ j ] = [ā j ,ū j ] correspond to the case when u j = u ′ j . Similarly when the player is content, a j =ā j and u ′ j =ū j , there is a possibility where u ′ j =ū j and the probability of this is less than p ǫ . The transitions when the player is discontent can be interpreted similarly. Thus we can see that the unperturbed process, i.e. when ǫ = 0, is the same as the unperturbed process in [11] . And it can be verified that these dynamics satisfy the conditions for a regular perturbed markov chain specified in [12] .
Let D be any state in D 0 and z, z ′ ∈ c 0 . It can be seen that the resistances for the paths z → D, D → z amd z → z ′ are the same as in [11] . For instance, the transition from z → D occurs only when a user experiments or the utility is miscalculated. Since we have p ǫ ≤ ǫ c , the probability of this event is O(ǫ c ) and hence the resistance of the transition is c. Similarly it can be seen that the resistances for the path D → z is (k − j∈[K]ū j ) and z → z ′ is bounded in [c.2c).
We have from the Lemma 2 that the recurrent classes of the unperturbed process are the same as in [11] and the resistances for the paths the same as in [11] . Thus from Theorem 1 of [11] , we have that the stochastically stable state is the one that maximises the sum of utilities of the players and by the definition of a stochastically stable state, it is the one played a majority of times in the matching phase. This is utilized by the counting process done in the matching phase and the action profile played the maximum number of times is played in the exploitation phase. Thus with high probability, the action profile maximising the sum of utilities is played in the exploitation phase.
We bound the probability of the optimal action profile not being played in the exploitation phase in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let a * = arg max a∈A K j=1 µ j (a j , k(a j )) and
Proof. Letū denote the utilities of the players for the optimal action profile a * . The optimal state of the markov chain is then z * = [a * ,ū, C K ]. Let the distribution of the markov chain after the first d = ⌈ρc 2 ℓ 1+δ ⌉ plays be φ. When the system is in state z, let the observed state as seen by the users be z ′ . The observed state would differ from the true state only in the utilities, due to the possibility that some users may calculate their utility functions incorrectly. The counting process in the matching phase of some epoch ℓ is done for L = ⌊c 2 (1 − ρ)ℓ (1+δ) ⌋. In order to bound the probability of the event {a * = a ′ }, we use the Chernoff Hoeffding bounds for markov chains from [13] , which is also used in [2] . The function f (z) considered here is f (z) = 1 {z=z * ,z ′ =z} This is the event when the state is in the optimal state and the state is also observed correctly (i.e. the utilities are observed correctly by all users). If the optimal state is played for more than L/2 plays and the utilities are calculated correctly by all the users for these plays, then the optimal action profile would be played in the exploitation phase. Thus we have that P (a * = a ′ ) ≤ P ( 
In order to use the bounds in [13] , we need E [f (z)]. Thus E [f (z)] = P (z = z * , z ′ = z) = P (z = z * )P (z ′ = z|z = z * )
We also have that
This gives E [f (z)] = µ f ≥ P (z = z * )(1 − Kǫ c ). And from the definition of a stochastically stable state, we can choose an ǫ small enough such that P (z = z * )(1 − Kǫ c ) > p > 1/2. Define η = 1 − 1 2µ f so that 0 < η < 1 when µ f > 1/2. Let T be the 1/8 mixing time of the markov chain. Thus from Theorem 3 of [13] we have that
where
